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boundless art, or beauty as the organisation of eternal life

1.

Art is what calls itself art and what is supported by the infrastructure of artistic production. This is the most general formulation of how art functions today. Not only contemporary art, but also the art of the past has to exist in this (institutional and nominalistic) regime. And this, probably, is why the productivists, who consciously refused to identify with artists (at least, with those who worked in the easel format) and who tried to sever their ties with the whole art system, still have relatively marginal status compared to other avant-garde artists, whose works are fully inscribed in the Western artistic canon. Although this canon includes works by Popova, Stepanova, Rodchenko and Tatlin, which correspond to the visual code of modernism, the conceptual and political foundations that made this code particularly important in the 1920s are often bracketed out. The life-creating intuitions of the modernists of the Silver Age – the symbolist poets, first and foremost – are also excluded because their aesthetic attitudes cannot be inscribed in the global art system that we have today.

In the present text, we will try to relate to the vagaries of Russian culture of the first third of the last century in a new way and to place the accents differently. This will require looking at that culture from a different viewpoint, thinking creatively about a post-capitalist future and what could come after contemporary art, whose primary matrix is modernism, which, despite its innovations, remains on the institutional territory allotted to it, and not the avant-garde, which challenges the boundaries of art and life. So, for our purposes, projects that are predicated on radical manifestations of the creative activity of mankind – productivism, as well as constructivism and cosmist life-creation – acquire special importance and call for theoretical and political interpretation.

Louis-Philippe Demers. Area V5. 2009 © Alastair Grant / AP

Two divergent tendencies are distinctly present in interpretations of productivist art. On the one hand, the ideas about life-building of the productivist Boris Arvatov and the constructivist artists who were close to him can be viewed as an abbreviated and secularised version of the cosmist life-creation, which we already mentioned and which is related to Russian religious thought. On the other hand, one might insist on the exclusively Marxist origins of productivism, which was influenced in its development by the philosophy of Alexander Bogdanov. As a rule, these tendencies are contrasted or even considered mutually exclusive. However, in a certain perspective, corresponding to the “post-capitalist” viewpoint that has been outlined, they not only coexist – they need each other.

2.

Cosmist life-creation and Marxist life-building each formulate in their own way the problems of death, love and social justice as problems that face each and every member of the human species (and at the limit, the universe as a whole), and offer their own solutions. Both life-creation and life-building consider themselves to be the crowning glory of the art we are accustomed to – from cave paintings to contemporary art practices – and at the same time they return art to its roots. Both life-creation and life-building argue that art was at some point forced, under the pressure of circumstances (primarily the invincibility of death and the economic necessity, which later gave rise to capitalism), to separate itself from the flow of life and become representative. The challenge for the future is to bring art back to life itself. This does not, of course, mean a return to the fetish of a particular art form, but the reinvention of art as an integral part of life based on a just society and a just natural order. This intention can also be found in the work of Nikolai Fyodorov, who wrote about art that is born out of biological creativity (like walking upright), but that cannot help becoming representative when faced with the threat of death (funeral lamentation and burial rituals).

The key difference between these two ways of thinking about the limits of the development of art is in the scale of the questions posed and the degree of ambition of the answers that are offered. Arvatov’s version suggests that the limitations of art are caused primarily by social injustice. After the class contradictions that gave rise to alienated creativity have been resolved, the artist again becomes an equal member of the production process. The further development of art is not oriented to the formulation of fundamental tasks (ontological, epistemological, etc.), but is tied to specific goals of production – to satisfy consumer needs; to resolve difficulties associated with the extraction and use of various materials; to design certain engineering solutions. The cosmist problematic begins exactly where this Marxist problematic, outlined by Arvatov, ends.

Even after the proletarian revolution and victory over the anarchy of production relations, there will be zones in the world that resist life-building organisation. First of all, these are affects, i.e., psychophysical states associated with deep personal experiences (most of all, love and death), states that are not fully mediated by social relations, no matter how harmonious these relations may become. If neither the experiences nor the affects themselves disappear, then the traditional artistic means of “supplementing” reality – traditional easel, representational art – will also persevere. This motif occurs quite often in Arvatov’s writings as an explanation of the emergence of certain artistic techniques that aim to give an illusory solution to real problems: “Since absolute organisation is practically unattainable, since some elements of disorganisation always remain in the personal life of the members of a socialist society, one might think that visual supplementation will remain even under socialism….

The individual will, apparently, compensate for his or her personal dissatisfaction through such artistically organised self-expression and communication. [1]

So the sphere of affect remains outside the scope of the organisational efforts of creativity. Matters are rather different for Fyodorov and the other cosmists. The experience of love and death, as a rule, finds its expression in sexual relations, which are the oldest means available to man in order to battle against death. Radical regulation of this experience by the elimination of its deepest causes (mortality, the disunity of humanity) is a key item of the cosmist agenda. In this regard the horizon of the problems, which cosmist art wishes to embrace, is the elimination of the biological specificity of the human species and even an evolutionary transformation of the Universe. However, the necessary condition for the emergence of such an art of life is the resolution of all social conflicts (inequality of the knowledgeable and the ignorant, old and young, peasants and workers, exploiters and exploited, etc.).

Neither Fyodorov nor the other cosmists explain how this state of affairs can be achieved. It is supposed that education and participation in what Fyodorov called “the common cause” will be sufficient. The cosmists do not describe the mechanisms of mutual integration of art, science, education and religion, which would sustain the intuition of immortality. Fyodorov avoided mystification of the tasks set by the doctrine of the common cause, instead prioritising scientific and technical victory over death and a technological resurrection of all people who have ever lived. For a man who, despite all his religiosity, remained an adherent of materialistic solutions, the absence of a description of the mechanisms for transforming the social order looks like an oversight. It is interesting that religious thinkers close to Fyodorov in spirit, such as Vladimir Solovyov, Sergei Bulgakov and Nikolai Berdyaev, who preferred mystical revelation rather than materialism, set a different goal and principal indicator of social change, namely the making-divine (“obozheniye”) of life on Earth as a particular spiritual and material state of the world and of a person. [2]

Page from the journal “Soviet Art” [Sovetskoye iskusstvo] №10, 1926 presenting a view of a crematorium © Nekrasov Central Library

We in the present day can say that creativity, which deals with a biological substrate, has now, in a way, become available to the artist: modern “science art” is gradually being transformed from an esoteric and costly enterprise into one that is increasingly accessible, where experiments can be carried out with various forms of life, including at the level of their biological organisation. [3] But this is by no means to suggest that the cosmist programme is being implemented. If productivism was frustrated by the limited possibilities of industrial production in the first third of the 20th century, in the 21st century the cosmists’ demand for life-creation is being met without the necessary basis, which is social justice. It seems that the life-creating (cosmist) and life-building (productivist) positions need to encounter each other once again in order to acknowledge their own limitations.

3.

The cosmist version of life-creation emerged from vigorous debates in the Russian intellectual world around Richard Wagner’s Gesamtkunstwerk. The influence of the German composer’s theoretical programme was particularly strong among the symbolists and it inspired and propagated interest in non-representational forms of creativity. One answer to Wagner was formulated by Fyodorov in his texts that drew a distinction between Ptolemaic art (the art of likenesses) and Copernican art (the art of true creation of life). Ptolemaic art is the creation of “supposed similarities” i.e., mimetic art, or, more generally, art as a particular practice limited by the institutional framework and going no further than conflict-resolution in thought. Copernican art is active: it involves the creative transformation of reality with the aim of technological victory over death and the material resurrection of all the dead. Fyodorov also describes how the transition from one art to another is to occur and what role science and technology will play in this transition: “The transition from the art of likeness to the art of reality, from Ptolemaic to Copernican art, is to be effected through a museum of all the sciences brought together in astronomy, that is, a museum with a tower and with a temple-school, a tower for observing shooting stars, for observing the ongoing construction of the world, and at the same time its collapse, and also for meteoric observations, transforming these observations into experience, into action, through conversion of the military art into the art of natural experiment. [4]

Ultimately cosmist life-creation not only achieves the material resurrection of the dead with the help of science and technology, but can also entail various mystical and miraculous accomplishments, such as the synthesis of the material and the ideal, the unity of heaven and earth, and even the second coming of Christ in the guise of creator. [5] Obviously, the Marxist interpretation of the creativity of life is inadequate for the cosmist thinkers and it is not surprising that productivism stops halfway. [6] It returns art to life (and even makes it Copernican in Fyodorov’s language), but it limits the sphere of life exclusively to the organisation of a new, maximally plastic, creatively organised form of production and, therefore, a new organisation of ordinary life.

In other words, as we already said, life-building for Arvatov does not imply a change in the biological foundations of human existence. For Fyodorov, on the contrary, ordinary life and the production that supports it do not have value in themselves and changes to them mean nothing unless the goal is the transformation of man as a species. Ordinary life and production are instrumentalised in the common cause; they are important only for the contribution they make to the resolution of all social and interpersonal conflicts in order to achieve the main goal, which is technological victory over death. Creativity is not a matter of reorganising an already existing, albeit insufficiently well-ordered life, but as the direct, biological production of life as such.

In Fyodorov’s Copernican version of art as the crowning achievement of a certain activity, we can see a repetition of the first creative act carried out by a person. For the inventor of the common cause, art begins when man first stands on his feet and establishes the two-legged mutation for future generations. This evolutionary leap expresses the urge to overcome the gravity of the Earth and the natural limitations that hold back the development of the human species. For the cosmists, evolution, the struggle to expand our capabilities as a species and the transformation of the world all rank as creative activity, as the basic and most important level of art. From which it follows that the transition to life-creation as resurrection is just such an evolutionary leap, one that changes the very idea of what is human. And, for the cosmists, this transformation would not be the last. The forward movement of evolution involves a creative change in conceptions of what life is and must end in a creative transformation of the entire cosmos. The human species is but a moment intervening between two biological mutations, between two creative acts.

4.

Marxist interpretations of productivist art tend to deny that Arvatov has anything to do with cosmism and with Russian religious philosophy. [7] The issue here is not just the absence of a direct intellectual continuity of life-creating ambitions, i.e., claims to a fundamental reorganisation of life, but also the decisive role of the historical situation: in the first post-revolutionary years, art was often perceived pragmatically, in the context of urgent tasks. [8] In the years when the concepts of productivist art were taking shape (and even more so a little earlier, during the conceptualisation of proletarian culture) it was believed that Marx and Engels did not develop their own aesthetic theory or, at least, they did not work it out in a systematic form. Arvatov’s concept of “Marxist aesthetics” assumed the removal of art from industry and ordinary life, but in a way that would resist the degradation of artistic achievements and would give scope for their creative interpretation. In other words, the goal of productivism was to make life as highly organised as art, and not the abandonment by art of its complexity and its dissolution in pragmatics and the urgent tasks of production. This was the interpretation of Marxist art that would influence Walter Benjamin (via the constructivist Sergei Tretyakov). Benjamin would view creative activity as various forms of industrial practice, in no way different as to their key principle from the capitalist production of goods. [9] It is important to note that, for Benjamin (and also for Brecht), relations of production are illuminated as if from within art, so that life as a conscious conflict of productive forces and production relations comes to the place of what had previously been the abstract, ideal, conflict-free realm of creativity. For Arvatov, the situation is somewhat different: the freedom of the professional artist has to be brought to the ossified relations of production that exist in life; the artist-engineer goes to production, and does not merely become conscious of his activity in the realm of art as production activity.

It is hard to argue with the Arvatov’s Marxist analysis, describing the gradual alienation of creative activity from social production. However, the thesis that art should abandon representation and engage in the creative reorganisation of production came in for criticism, even from the left. The Marxist authenticity of the aspiration of post-revolutionary art to overcome its own borders is put in question by Mikhail Lifshits and authors of the 1930s who were close to him. Lifshits devoted most of his life to a reconstruction of the aesthetic views of Marx and Engels, according to which the true meaning of art for Marx lies in high-class representational realism and such realism does not have to be completely determined by the artist’s attitude to the class struggle. The masterpieces of past eras were often created in spite of the author’s place in the system of social production, i.e., in spite of class affiliation.

In this sense, every great work of art, on the one hand, anticipates the aesthetics of the future, the aesthetics of a free communist society, and, on the other hand, it necessarily contains a “residue” of the historical era when it was created.

The conceptualisation of Marxist aesthetics, proposed by Lifshits, which can, at a push, be called “conservative”, laid the intellectual ground for the doctrine of socialist realism. So Lifshits was the first theorist to provide a systematic analysis that defined the range of possibilities of Soviet aesthetic theory for many decades to come, at a time when, in the international context, debates over the relationship between Marxism and art were only just getting started. [10]

For Lifshits, the art of the historical avant-garde and modernism consisted almost entirely of the “sediment” of the era of industrial capitalism. It contained nothing that could stand the test of time. So it could make no claim either to the significance, which some masterpieces of the past certainly possessed, or to the strength of the socialist aesthetic of the future society, liberated by the proletarian revolution. However, Lifshits considered his main opponent to be “vulgar sociology” (he himself was among the originators and propagators of the term), represented by Vladimir Fritsche, Yeremia Ioffe and other Marxist sociologists, including Alexei Fyodorov-Davydov and Boris Arvatov. They, in turn, insisted that cultural products are completely determined by the class position of their producers, so that, prior to the proletarian revolution, art could only reflect various ideological distortions of reality associated with the class struggle. [11] Productivism also received its share of criticism from Lifshits in the 1930s. According to Lifshits, by rejecting the representative function, productivist art simply replicates reality, losing the defining characteristic of art, which is figurativeness, i.e., the ability to reflect reality in an artistic form: “By reproducing reality, art takes possession of it in fantasy, forms a bridge between the realm of necessity and that of freedom. Science gives a picture of prevailing necessity; in practical life our freedom is limited by historical conditions, by the necessity of labour and suffering. Only art transports us from the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom, which begins on the other side of purposeful labour. This artistic reproduction of life is the development of the productive creative energy of human beings «as an end in itself». [12]

Eduardo Kac. The Eigth Day. 2001–2002 © https://vimeo.com/318551099.

Of course, as rational spontaneity develops, all human practice will acquire a creative character and will approach art. The practice itself will acquire a gnomic character, so to speak – it will cease to be grossly utilitarian, egoistically hostile or hooligan, destroying everything around it. And our “historical materialist” understanding of practice is still utilitarian in the spirit of the “theory of exploitation” of the 18th century, multiplied by Meyerhold’s Earth Rampant. Dialectical, creative practice cannot, of course, be reduced to pure contemplation, but it includes a moment of contemplation. This is the unity of decision and indecision, of unity and contradiction, the harmony of harmony and disharmony. [13]

One may disagree with Lifshits’ aesthetic assessments, but there is no denying his knowledge of Marxist texts. He is right that careful reading of relevant fragments in the texts of Marx and Engels, which reveal their views on art, do not give grounds for requiring artistic activity to renounce the representational function and to “remove” this function in production. Where, then, does this demand arise for the Marxist productivist Arvatov?

Arvatov owes much of his intuition to the influence of Alexander Bogdanov’s “organisational” version of Marxism. [14] The original direction of Bogdanov’s revision took shape in the early 1900s, during his work on the text Empiromonism. The reflections of that period, which underpin Bogdanov’s aesthetic positions, would later define the policy of Proletkult. First and foremost, Bodganov stresses the need for unity of sensory experience, the achievement of which is hindered by contradictions inherent to the political and economic organisation of production – contradictions that can only be overcome by the proletarian revolution. Experience, according to Bogdanov, is an ontological category; there is no gap between subject and object, mental and physical. Mental experience is individual, unmediated and poorly organised; physical experience is mediated and socially organised. The two types of experience are differently organised, sensory forms of correlation with the world. The sphere of art is only a special case of organisational activity. Bogdanov actually writes that “beauty is organisation”. [15]

The goal of the class struggle is to restore the integrity of experience, which was first lost under feudalism due to the formation of an authoritarian type of organisation, and then, under capitalism, due to the anarchy of the market and of production, i.e., because of disorganisation. So the way in which, for example, the bourgeoisie organises the world (especially at the reactionary stage of its development) is fundamentally different from the way, which will be available to the proletarian in the future. Firstly, the proletarian is directly, physically and mentally involved in the labour process, i.e., in the process of (re)organising nature; secondly, the activity of the proletarian proceeds from the need to eliminate the disorganisation of the capitalist mode of production. In this regard, Bogdanov insists on the independent value of “proletarian culture” as a special way of existing in the world: without this value, the proletarian revolution could degenerate into a military dictatorship in the service of state communism.

A. Shaykhet. Crèche in “New Life” [Novaya Zhizn] kolkhoz. Source: journal “Soviet Photo” [Sovetskoye foto] №11, 1931

Art for Bogdanov is only the organisation of colours on a canvas or letters in a text, representing certain problems of organisation as such. Despite his desire to integrate all life experience into a certain integrity, Bogdanov denies art the possibility of full integration. [16] Art belongs primarily to the “superstructure” and not to the “base”, and does not penetrate directly into the sphere of life or production. In this sense, art is a way of organising organisers, but it is not organisation as such. Bogdanov’s artist-organiser certainly differs from the artist as ideologue of a class divorced from production, but the difference is not radical enough to enable him/her to match the artist as engineer of life, as defined by the productivists. Here Bogdanov is paradoxically close not only to the Marxist letter, but also to Lifshits, despite all their significant differences (as an example of their differences, Bogdanov’s urge to highlight the unique culture of the proletariat and justification of attention to the classics based solely on their skill of execution were unacceptable to Lifshits). Bogdanov’s intuitions imply a critique of modernist trends and suggest that the workers of Proletkult must be ready to learn from the classics (for example, from the romantics, who expressed the progressive and even revolutionary sentiments of the bourgeoisie), and not from Bogdanov’s experimentalist contemporaries – the modernists, who express the decay of the bourgeoisie as a class. However, these intellectual intuitions are present in Bogdanov only in a schematic or, as Lifshits would say, in a “vulgar” form: “In art, form is inextricably linked with content, and that is why the “latest” is not always the most perfect. When a social class has fulfilled its progressive role in the historical process and is in decline, the content of its art inevitably becomes decadent, and the form follows and adapts to the content. The degeneration of the ruling class usually happens through a transition to parasitism. It is followed by satiety, dulling the sense of life…

In general and in the main, art technique should be learned, not from these organisers of decay in life, but from the great workers of art, who were engendered by the rise and flourishing of classes that are now obsolete, from the revolutionary romantics and from the classics of various periods. All that can to be learned from the “latest” artists are minor details, in which – it is true – they often excel, but even then caution is required, to avoid picking up the seeds of decay from such close contact. [17]

However, Proletkult and the productivist avant-garde did not heed the call to “learn from the classics”. Proletkult was a typical post-symbolist avant-garde association, which, unlike the more radical art movements that existed alongside it (primarily the futurists), tried in many ways to follow Bogdanov’s instructions through a commitment to what might be called “content”, [18] although it was content that went beyond the boundaries that had been drawn for art. The exponents of Proletkult generally reduced work with form to a minimum (due to a lack of professional creative education and experience in creative work), which entailed excessive borrowing (sometimes without conscious dialogue with and rethinking of the borrowed material) and paradoxical inventions. While Western experimenters at the beginning of the last century strove to bring industrial objects onto the territory of art, the exponent of Proletkult, on the contrary, tried to apply the techniques of the art of the past in real life (at the factory and ordinary life). They turned bourgeois culture into a readymade in reverse. [19] For example, Bogdanov, defending the organisational value of art, writes that the performance of songs by a work collective increases labour productivity. On this basis the slogan for cultural activity of the proletariat in the first post-revolutionary decade might be: “Appropriate the appropriated!”.

But we should emphasise once again that the practice of the Proletkult exponents as “creators on the production line” goes beyond the simple idea of ​​appropriating form from the classics and filling it with new proletarian content. To reduce the activity of Proletkult to the production of representative art is to reduce it to production that would be secondary in relation to the classics or futurists. [20] The excesses of Proletkult and of the productivist avant-garde that inherited is legacy offer insight to the scale and radicalism of the transformations that early Soviet art underwent.

In this context – in the context of art – it is worth mentioning Bogdanov’s medical experiments (Bogdanov had a medical training). Moving away, for various reasons, from the ideological leadership of the cultural activities of the nascent working class, Bogdanov began to experiment with the rejuvenating potential of blood transfusion. At first glance, such activity is far from aesthetics, but only if we interpret both aesthetics and art in a narrow and literal sense. Viewed in the context of productivist art and Proletkult, Bogdanov’s medical preoccupations can be seen as a continuation of the logic and ambitions of those movements, and as a climax of the historic avant-garde. In his role as avant-garde artist Bogdanov invented a method for efficient, “revolutionising” impact on the person, including at the level of the body. So a refusal of mediation through culture, leading to a “biologisation” of creativity, can be seen as a new, next step: the life-building logic reaches its limit and passes into life-creation, as it had once been defined by the cosmists. [21]

However, Bogdanov’s aesthetic theory turns out to be divorced not only from his experimental practice, but also from the philosophical logic of empiromonism. This gap is perhaps historical in nature and explained by the fact that empiromonism, i.e., an approach that asserts the complete unity of experience, can only be realised in a classless society. In a sense, Bogdanov’s position on art turns out to be more orthodox Marxist (at least in Lifshits’ version of Marxism) than his philosophy (and then science) of organisation, which was translated into the language of aesthetic theory by the exponents of the productivist avant-garde.

Bogdanov’s philosophy and his understanding of science stem from the theories of knowledge of Richard Avenarius and Ernst Mach. These were the thinkers who led Bogdanov to believe that ideas about the world are based on sensory experience and that science always deals only with simplified, constructed generalisations from experience – “complexes of sensations”. However, unlike the thinkers who inspired him and who were only interested in the epistemological status of such complexes, Bogdanov points out that “complexes of sensations” are mediated by social organisation, which means that they simply cannot be neutral. So he historicises the contradictions inherent in the methods of generalising a single stream of experience, attributing their specificity to a particular social formation. This emphasises the social and, therefore, the class character of construction of the “complexes of sensations”, which constitute the world for the person who perceives it. The organising activity of the proletariat, hindered by capitalist production, lies in the ability to carry out the maximum integration of experience, going as far as elimination of the differences between man, machine and thing. Only a new proletarian culture and science will be capable of reorganising sensory experience of the world. They will cleanse perception of the world of intellectual distortions and achieve “monism” or wholeness of life.

5.

The theory of industrial art arose independently of Russian religious philosophy and was not directly influenced by cosmist thought. However, the realisation in art by Arvatov and his fellow productivists of the ideas of Bogdanov’s empiromonism inevitably crossed the border that separated art production from the rest of industry: both could be understood as different complexes of sensations, socially constructed in the process of cognising the world and deciphering experience. Such an understanding, in turn, contradicts both the representative aesthetics of Marx and Engels, as described by Lifshits, and the aesthetic views of Bogdanov himself, as expressed in Proletkult.

Bogdanov’s characteristic striving for the integrity of life experience, for the direct creation of life and its organisation in order to achieve complete social, national, sexual and intergenerational equality in the overcoming through technology of the natural limitations of the human species is consonant with the ambitions of several of the cosmists. Think particularly of the calls by Fyodorov and Muravyov for social justice (overcoming the divided state of humanity) and, at the same time, for technological organisation of the world and of time in order to vanquish death. Bogdanov’s scientific, practical and medical activity – his organisation of an institute for blood transfusion, which would rejuvenate and achieve intergenerational unity of the proletariat – tended in the same direction. [22]

Arvatov’s interpretation of Bogdanov’s ideas as applied to art brings them to their logical conclusion, but only as far as a solution to the problems of social organisation, without affecting the biological level of the production of life. If Bogdanov’s programme were to be fully implemented, productivism would be supplemented by the life-creation of the cosmists with their desire to accelerate and transform the evolutionary process, understood as the highest form of artistic activity. Beauty is not only organisation, but organisation of eternal life; it is organisation that penetrates to the deepest level of the structure of the world and overcomes the contradictions that lie at its foundations.

Translation: Ben Hooson

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institutionalisation: fighting it, using it

Arseny Zhilyaev: There have been more and more reports in recent years, even in non-specialised media, of museum staff standing up for their rights through trade unions, and doing so in spite of the specifics of the work they do and the mores that are customary in “temples of art”. We hear of actions to protest against a museum’s sponsorship policy or aspects of its display, its exhibition policies. We might see this as a drive towards social recognition of the museum as a special kind of factory with its own special kind of production – the idea is not novel in critical theory. With that there comes a drive to make this production more fair and ethical in respect of its employees and the people who depend on it, not through artistic action, but through action in “real life”, without reference to art. This seems to me to be an important difference between contemporary museum activism and the forms of resistance that were customary in the professional contemporary art community in the last century.

What were those forms? Refusal to interact with the museum (as an institution that was corrupt by default), to participate in the entertainment industry, to commercialise works of art, and all sorts of “rupture” – from torn canvases to posters demanding various changes. All this might be described as a kind of artists’ strike, one that has been going on for more than a century. All well and good, you may say – this negativity is the fuel of art. But what we are actually looking at here is a workaday routine – for a contemporary artist artistic protest, evasion, self-critical reflection, baring the device, etc., is like dropping by the filling station and choosing a fuel. I am reminded of Daniel Buren’s response to Goran Djordjevic’s letter of 1979 asking him and other leading artists to take part in an artists’ strike.[1] The Frenchman, like most of the other addressees, declined the invitation, but his justification expresses the essence of the dilemma very accurately. Buren said he had already been on strike for nearly 15 years, because he hadn’t produced any new forms in that time. So for a real strike you need something like a strike within a strike.

Awareness of this paradox of art production was a stumbling block for many. Djordjevic later proposed his own solution to the problem. Radical criticism of the art project as progeny of the capitalist system, anonymity, going outside the territory of art while at the same time appropriating its infrastructure, building institutionality. Factually, Djordjevic adopted the position of an anonymous researcher, like an anthropologist, studying the artefacts of art merely as evidence of a certain historical period. It is interesting that, for the unprepared viewer, such research can be hard to distinguish visually from what he/she sees on a visit to a regular museum exhibition. But, then, the icons in textbooks of art history do not differ from the icons you see in a church. Djordjevic has worked for several decades as a “doorman” or “technical assistant” of the Museum of American Art (Berlin), only occasionally returning to the traditional role of an artist.

Helvetia Park exhibition at Musée d’ethnographie de Neuchâtel, Switzerland. 2009–2010 © Musée d’ethnographie de Neuchâtel

This is just one example of a general and increasingly noticeable trend. There has been a shift of the agenda from the level of the individual artistic utterance to the level of the exhibition, the level of reflection of institutional organisation. Whereas, before, it was mainly artists who engaged in institutional criticism or trade union work within art, today, in campaigns led by museum unions, artists often seem to be on the other side of the barricades. Or, at least, their interventions do not have consequences that are as serious as those of an institutional protest. They remain on the ground of what is “art-ificial” and can therefore, for the most part, be ignored. Faith in artistic activism has been undermined, as have the promises of art in general. There is a sense, let’s say, of exhaustion of the resource of purely artistic innovation through criticism. As if everything that could be said in the framework of the “work of art” has already been said. The ball is in the court of more complex formations, where this utterance is included as one of several structural elements.

I hasten to qualify – what we are talking about here is primarily the USA and, in part, Europe. Russia and the post-Soviet space as a whole have to be bracketed. There, at this stage, people seem ready to forgive any injustice in labour relations or exhibition policy so long as they can have a normally functioning museum, they can work there, etc. Generally though, do you agree with my assessment and, if so, how do you explain the current institutional politicisation?

Maria Silina: I would say that the museum unions you are talking about, such as those at the Museum of Modern Art in New York and in Los Angeles, are part of a global and diverse network of actors who are destabilising the supra-class status of the museum. Local activists and academic workers, together with museum workers and artists, are showing us that the museums themselves are only a part of a big social system that is developing towards ever greater regulation. It seems to me that this is the most problematic aspect of the trend: tight regulation of the aspiration towards greater flexibility and adaptability of the system.

I follow what has been happening as regards tariffs and copyright. There is a harking back to the experience of the 1970s, when the question of the material value of the non-material labour of the artist was raised in legal terms for the first time. The first contract where that material value figured was the Artist’s Reserved Rights Transfer and Sale Agreement, published in the catalogue of Documenta 5 in 1972. The idea was that the artist receives a percentage from the resale of his/her works (by a dealer, gallery or museum). There are more and more independent initiatives of this kind nowadays, including some that come from artists, like Working Artists and the Greater Economy (W.A.G.E.), which was set up in New York in 2008.

Chris Burden. Shoot. 1971 © Chris Burden

The other actors in museum infrastructure who are now in the spotlight are sponsors, especially those who have made money in an ethically unacceptable way. Here, museum workers are tied by a loyalty policy, and the activism comes from artists and social groups. For example, we have actions by the Decolonize this Place movement demanding the removal of businessmen who provide sponsorship money to the Museum of Modern Art (MoMA) that comes from the sale of weapons, from the operation of prisons for immigrants, etc. This is an attack on the supposedly apolitical and supra-class infrastructure of artistic reproduction. I have followed actions by public associations like the Boyle Heights group in Los Angeles, against so-called “art washing”, protesting against the routine multiplication of exhibition spaces. They are not against art and museums as such, but against their asocial role, which is judged to be antisocial.

In Europe too it is not museum workers, but academic scholars who have shown up the structural problem of the museum in its fusion with aggressive state policy, the policy of colonialism. This has been facilitated by “Provenienzforschung”, the study of provenance, which is traditional work for scholars. What they have shown is that museums benefit directly from colonial goods and should reflect on this heritage. The positive activist programme of scholars is for legal regulation of relationships with former colonies. This is the logic of activism in the legal sphere. So the classic channels of expertise (archives, museums) are used by scholars not to strengthen these institutions, but to destabilise them and encourage them to play a more active public role.

In Russia, as you say, the museum doesn’t assume any functions other than the storage and exhibition of objects. I connect this with the Soviet tradition of museumification of the national heritage. The Bolsheviks in 1917 were quick to declare themselves protectors of heritage and they encouraged the opening of museums wherever possible. But by the mid-1920s. these museumified estates and mansions, which had been opened as small collections of nationalised treasures, began to be closed down, often in a barbaric manner. A lot was sold, a lot was lost. The dispersion of the collection of the Museum of Pictorial Culture in Moscow is one example (it was recently the subject of an exhibition at the Tretyakov Gallery). In general, from the 1930s onwards it was as much as museums could do to cling onto their functions of preservation and collection, functions that state power constantly put in question. So, historically, even the function of exhibiting has been difficult for Russian museums to maintain. Remember the scandals at the Tretyakov Gallery, when the Gallery forbade independent tours. The museum restricts its visitors, even its most loyal visitors – lovers of art. It’s not just that Russian museums don’t assume social functions – they zealously reject them.

AZ: Speaking of the Tretyakov Gallery, there is something positive we could mention. I think you will agree that Aleksey Fedorov-Davydov was a precursor of contemporary critical museum institutionalism – a sort of “avant-gardist 2.0” – with his Experimental Complex Marxist Exhibition at the Tretyakov in the early 1930s. It didn’t nourish illusions about destroying the museum and returning to the pre-industrial, guild mode of production (a characteristic theme of modernism), but there was a clear understanding of the need to transform art production, the need for demonstration and distribution. Here, art is analysed as a part of the real relationships of production, and only subsequently as a form of existence of ideological content. And this analysis is not labelled as an artistic utterance. In a sense, we are again presented with a rupture, a black square; not on canvas, however, but in the form of an exhibition. The works of the avant-garde, which had declared themselves to be zero, are themselves zeroed, subjected to criticism and de-aestheticised . And, importantly, the institution itself acts as a trigger for this situation. The museum turns out to be more radical than the art radicals. Methodologically, this is a process of defamiliarisation of the history of art and of the museum as specific products of a political and economic development that has to be transformed in the conditions of the proletarian state.

I think that when most contemporary art activists, both in the domestic context and beyond, refer to the historical avant-garde and production art, they lose sight of the role of the institution. In his museum experiments Fedorov-Davydov is the successor of Boris Arvatov and Sergey Tretyakov, with their ideals, while the anarchist dreamer Malevich is better suited as a hero for the art activists. But then, Malevich was at the origins of the Museum of Pictorial Culture, so his anti-institutional impulse was not without pragmatic exceptions. You are currently working on a book about the museum experiments of Soviet avant-garde artists. Do you think that Fedorov-Davydov’s experience is relevant to the current situation?

MS: Experiments with Marxist art criticism attract growing attention today. I am writing a book about exhibitions in art museums in the 1920s and 1930s and I see this interest. It was the time when the modernist museum was being constructed on the principle of a white cube, which became the “standard” for museum spaces by the end of the 1930s. Attempts to find a non-easel and non-formalistic museum exhibition stand out on the background of this modernist tendency, are they are what I am analysing.

But first I’ll say something about the enhanced, intensified institutionality, which you described so well. It is true that analysis of the legacy of art institutions such as GINKhUK [the State Institute of Artistic Culture] or even the Museum of Artistic Culture in a recent exhibition at the Tretyakov observed a strict separation between the intellectual agenda and infrastructure, the morphology of cultural production. Or, as in the case of the Museum of Pictorial Culture or the Museum Office, which distributed the work of avant-garde artists across the country, the material history of these initiatives is ignored. The very concepts of the laboratory and of experimentation are dematerialised, and that represents a departure from the more complex conditions of an analysis of the avant-garde heritage. The case of Fedorov-Davydov confronts us directly with this new, reinforced institutionality. I want to emphasise that Fedorov-Davydov burst into the museum world as an antagonist and started work to construct the museum as an art-history laboratory. He was not a museum worker, he was an art critic who came to the museum, and he came as a bureaucrat and a Communist. He came as an employee of the Main Section for Literature and Art of the People’s Commissariat for Education, which was set up to enforce greater control over the arts, and he came as a committed Marxist and Party member.

Fedorov-Davydov worked under the banner of formal sociological art criticism. He analysed both the formal (visual) and also the material properties of the picture. He showed paintings functionally, indirectly, through their role on the art market, as components of the exhibition machine, as products of the philosophy of patronage and of the art market.

this conception of the progress of art through an overcoming of the easel, superimposed on the idea of a transition period from capitalism to socialism, created a time loop: constant relapses of easel art, a recursive movement.

The logic of his concept of art criticism came from the work of Boris Arvatov. Under Arvatov’s influence, Fedorov-Davydov treated the history of Western and Russian art as the development of easel painting, which had arrived at a state of self-denial by the time of the First World War and the 1917 Revolution. Here, for example, we have the famous photograph of the Tretyakov Gallery in 1931 with Malevich’s Black Square, which, according to Fedorov-Davydov, symbolised art “in the impasse of self-denial”. This experimental exhibition gets read as the forerunner of the Nazis’ Degenerate Art exhibition of 1937, where paintings were shown in order to be reviled. There is a great deal of misunderstanding …

AZ: … Yes, it is extremely annoying. When I was only starting to work with the legacy of Fedorov-Davydov, I also quickly discovered that he is perceived in the English-language context as an equivalent of Nazi aggressivity. The one and a half publications that were available on the English-language Internet in the early 2010s were precisely about that. I was once at a conference in New York dedicated to artist-curators, where I tried to present Fedorov-Davydov’s practice in context. I don’t think I succeeded in convincing the audience, but perhaps my Russian English was to blame. Claire Bishop said that it really is impossible to find anything in English, but there was one French publication that tried to theorise on the topic. I never found the publication. And there weren’t many Russian-speaking authors I knew who were interested in the topic – just a couple of people. First, I communicated in New York with Masha Chlenova, who wrote a dissertation on Fedorov-Davydov, but she hadn’t come back to the theme until very recently and she interpreted the Marxist exhibition very tendentiously, in accordance with the “degenerate” line. The other person was Andrey Kovalev, one of our distinguished Moscow critics, who also wrote a thesis on Fedorov-Davydov. His judgments were free of international clichés, but were more of a historiographic nature.

The interpretation closest to me was that of Goran Djordjevic. He suggested that the inclusion of Malevich and other avant-garde artists in the Marxist exhibition, albeit as a target for criticism, paradoxically made it possible to keep them in the museum.

My version has always been that Fedorov-Davydov acted according to the logic of “criticism of criticism”. He criticised the avant-garde for a kind of fetishisation of the device, albeit of the critical device and albeit of a device that brought dividends and made an important contribution to the development of art. The new situation of the post-revolutionary proletarian state called for a new working method, which was born in debates about realism. I believe that the version proposed by Fedorov-Davydov can be interpreted as “conceptual realism”. The term itself was proposed by Ekaterina Degot’ to refer to the practices of Solomon Nikritin, particularly his famous pedagogical exhibition at the laboratory of the Museum of Pictorial Culture, and the experiments of painters who rejected any clear stylistic attachment, so that they could be ready for life’s changes. But it seems to me that the idea of “conceptual realism” as a kind of umbrella term was most fully realised in the practices of Fedorov-Davydov. He presented a panorama of aesthetic approaches, critically contextualising them in installation complexes and documentary information about the economy of their production. In other words, Fedorov-Davydov wanted to be more radical than the historical avant-garde that we know.

MS: In my opinion, Fedorov-Davydov’s achievement was to articulate the panorama of aesthetic approaches through Arvatov’s idea of easel art. He did not have time to do more. The devices he used in exhibiting contemporary art show Malevich as the pinnacle of painting mastery, as the conceptual limit of the development of easel art, where it reaches the point of self-denial. From that point onwards, Fedorov-Davydov says, a new class – the proletariat, the worker-artist, the self-taught artist – will adopt Malevich’s formal methods in the new economic conditions. In 1929, Fedorov-Davydov showed two exhibitions side by side at the Tretyakov Gallery: works by Malevich and works from Leningrad’s Izoram [Young Workers’ Art Studios]. His curatorial idea was to show clearly how formal devices in Malevich’s works could be used in new, non-easel art forms by new agents – self-taught proletarians. For him, however, neither Malevich nor Izoram are yet proletarian art, because the socialist base of art production has not yet been established. Their work still only represents approaches to the new. This is what is particularly subtle in Fedorov-Davydov’s thought: contemporary art of the 1920s and the beginning of the 1930s is a relapse to easel art, and all that is new in it is the search for socialist themes and a few stylistic elements. In this Fedorov-Davydov follows the ideas of Alexander Bogdanov, who believed as a matter of principle that new art can only be developed by a new class, the proletariat, and he is also close to the positions of Leo Trotsky and Nikolai Bukharin on the possibility or impossibility of creating proletarian art in the conditions of transition from capitalism to a classless society. Fedorov-Davydov postulated that he was, in fact, working in a suspension of time: his contemporary history hovered between capitalism and socialism. This conception of the progress of art through an overcoming of the easel, superimposed on the idea of a transition period from capitalism to socialism, created a time loop: constant relapses of easel art, a recursive movement. An inability to have done with capitalism. This timelessness is the key and the main difficulty of such a prognostic model of the history of art.

AZ: People often forget how productive this period was. Even at the level of the use of words. My colleagues have often corrected me when I discarded the word “opytnaya”, which basically means “experimental” [“eksperimental’naya”] from the title of Fedorov-Davydov’s “complex Marxist exhibition”. Tell me in more detail how Fedorov-Davydov’s methodology worked in practice, what was “experimental” about his approach?

MS: In 1930, Fedorov-Davydov organises an exhibition of works with revolutionary and Soviet themes. The criterion for inclusion of works in the exhibition was that they should contain elements of the movement towards socialist, non-easel art, i.e., new genres and themes, new types of art – the “components of everyday life”. He actually said, regarding this exhibition, that he wanted an image of the future and that the choice of works was almost random. Of course, the works were not random, but he had no formalistic visual obsession with only showing things that were excellently made. On the contrary, the near-randomness of unfinished sketches, children’s drawings, architectural projects were meant to hint that something was going to happen, something was ripening. The exhibition was visually and museographically chaotic, by all accounts, but it is important that it was presented as experimental. And yet, by inertia, it still gets interpreted as an exhibition of triumph, an exhibition of the progress of Soviet art. This is the fundamental difference between the ideas of Fedorov-Davydov and the subsequent paradigm of both socialist realism and “pogrom exhibitions” like Degenerate Art. Fedorov-Davydov predicts genres, themes and iconography – all of this was his material. He defines particular “slots” of art production – this was his work as an expert. He does not focus on specific artists: the museum is not for specific artists, but for identifying the class struggle and… methods of art criticism. This “Soviet-themed” exhibition ended, for example, with a stand displaying new Marxist literature, and not naturalistically, with bags of coal. Osip Brik said at a museum conference in 1919 that real artistic life takes place at exhibitions, but museums are research institutes, and Fedorov-Davydov embodied this. So, for him, the museum is a showcase of art history. He did not define what good museum art was. Instead, he used formal sociological tools to mark the boundaries of his competence, predicting genres and types of artistic production. He was normative in respect of the future proletarian art, but absolutely flexible in respect of current art processes, partly because they could never reach as far as the fundamentally new future.

Niki de Saint Phalle with her gun after having shot the painting. 1963 © Gerhard Rauch–Maxppp

The special value of Fedorov-Davydov’s method is that he tried to move away from formalism in the hanging of exhibitions, from an approach that only compares illusionistic techniques on the canvas. He opposed Darwinism in art criticism, which was very clearly present in the exhibitions of museums of art and painting, where works were displayed based on their authorship and the way objects were transformed on the canvas – from volume to objectlessness. That applies to Alfred Barr in New York and his idea of the development of art from realism to abstraction. None of that went beyond the illusionistic surface of the canvas.

AZ: We started by saying that we are now seeing a transformation of the role of the institution and a critique of the institution as such. But let’s talk about how feasible it would be to re-enact Fedorov-Davydov’s experiments in today’s reality. It always seemed to me that it is only possible to enact such experiments in full after a revolution. It is impossible to imagine a biennale or a large museum exposition today that would nullify art through its contextualisation in the specifics of the class struggle. If you believe that an exhibition is always a hybrid, that it always contains different levels of control and is not determined solely by a charter of the artist’s sovereign freedom, but also by the institutional freedom of the curator (limited by social consensus), you quickly grasp what the boundaries are. Although I would love to attend such an event. The only way forward, barring a change of the social order, is, paradoxically, a return to the level of the artist and his/her work, but represented by the figure of a researcher, somebody who sets up experiments in a laboratory in the hope that sooner or later they will go beyond its walls.

MS: If we take the strategies of art museums, where exhibitions are based on formal- genetic and stylistic derivations, there is nothing to suggest that such a systematic review is possible. For example, a new MoMA exhibition opened in New York in the autumn of 2019. The curators play with visual aspects of the collection as part of a diversification of gender and cultural variety. They have successful formal exchanges between types of art, they make full use of material and the juxtaposition of genres, but their slogan and general idea are conservative: “An extraordinary collection, remixed”. This visual remix, these stylistic juxtapositions reveal at once the conceptual weakness of art museum exhibitions: Picasso’s Demoiselles d’Avignon (1907) is put alongside a work by Faith Ringgold, American People Series # 20: Die (1967), which deals with race conflict and murder. It’s amusing to note that the curators have changed the source: Ringgold was inspired by Guernica, which was exhibited in the Museum from 1943 to 1981, but they are showing a direct juxtaposition of Picasso and his sex workers in Demoiselles d’Avignon and Ringgold’s interracial slaughter. Clearly there is a need here for the additional materials and expositions that Fedorov-Davydov used in art museums. They could do with a holistic critical framework like Fedorov-Davydov’s class struggle and his formal-sociological understanding of creative activity and artistic production. Additional exhibitions of that kind are feasible for small museums that build a narrative around a well-prepared critical canvas, for example, the history of American slavery, the history of Nazism. So the Worcester Art Museum transcoded its portrait gallery to reveal those subjects who made money from slavery in the United States, whereby the gallery inscribed itself in a wider social context. German art historians and museologists make exhibitions drawing on huge amounts of additional material (archives, texts, art reviews) and discuss the strategies by which modernist artists such as Emil Nolde and the Die Brücke group were adapted to the Nazi cultural bureaucracy. I think that Fedorov-Davydov would have been interested in these experiments.

Fedorov-Davydov had this freedom in experiments with contemporary art because of a strong belief in the possibility of socialist production in the context of the crisis of capitalism. This belief was reinforced by that elusive and, in his case, academic position of an interval of timelessness between capitalism and socialism, in which he lived and where modernity was a “relapse”. It seems to me that this crisis-relapse mode of expectation is still with us, but we don’t have the political base that potentially promises change, as it existed in Fedorov-Davydov’s time. In principle, though, museums themselves are now ready to experiment further with their own institutional sustainability. For example, a couple of years ago the Victoria and Albert Museum in London faced criticism of its acquisitions as a typical case of art washing. The museum had acquired a fragment of a demolished block of flats (Robin Hood Gardens), built in the 1970s in brutalist style. The point was that the Robin Hood Gardens development was another failed modernist experiment in the design of social housing. It’s a typical sad story: the social purpose of a project fails, and prestigious museums thrive on a topical agenda. But for the museum, this critical reaction was intellectual fuel for its exhibition: it made the acquisition of the fragment socially significant, and it was written into the exhibition programme. Yes, the museum will not directly affect social inequality, but some museums are now ready to articulate the problems of which they are historically a part, including by their very function of preserving and exhibiting these fragments of social failures.

Translation: Ben Hooson

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the museum of utilitarian art

1. “Museum” is a bad word, but it is shorter than any other name that comes to hand, particularly when a headline is required.

So, a museum.

The practical basis of all museums today is collecting as a goal in itself, rather than any specific mission. Every art museum is a collection of numerous unique objects, which are not to be taken out of the museum and each of which has value in itself. This applies most of all to museums of easel art, where the works were created as unique, and which, by its nature, is formalistic to such an extent that the replacement of one exhibit by another is not tolerated.

Stand in the pavilion of imported goods at the 1941 First Molotov Regional Exhibition of Consumer Goods

Another feature of art museums is their archaism. There are museums of historic furniture, of native-exotic art and of the paintings of past eras, but there are hardly any museums that are entirely oriented to the present.

Finally, the third characteristic of art museums is that the tasks, which they set themselves, are of a non-practical nature. Their collections are either scientific-historical or theoretical-systematic, enclosed in a specific, purely educational interest; or they are collections of contemplative-aesthetic values. These three tasks are usually combined in every museum.

Stand of construction materials at the 1941 First Molotov Regional Exhibition of Consumer Goods

2. The revolutionary-utilitarian art of today is, of course, notably absent from our museums. They may be prepared to accept something new in the nature of easel art (the more right-wing and archaic, the better), but the museologists and other bigwigs turn away in contempt from utilitarian art: at most, they offer to arrange occasional exhibitions or advise utilitarian artists to manage on their own somehow, etc.

the “permanent utilitarian-art exhibition” should not include a single “eternal” exhibit. each section of the exhibition should be updated along the lines of technical development and the formulation of other tasks associated with the organisation of everyday life.

But utilitarian art (the invention of industrial items, standards in everyday life, forms of Agit-prop [1], design of occasional campaigns and celebrations, posters, advertisements, illustrations, all kinds of mobile shows, mock-ups, models, drafts, plans, etc.) needs a permanent centre where the inventions of industrial designers, their formal and technical achievements and standardised utilitarian forms can be shown; where the creations of artists who are scattered across different cities and art institutions can be compared and discussed; where art workers and industrial workers can meet; where laboratories could be organised, connected with the laboratories of scientific and industrial institutes (such institutes still fail to understand the need for artistic engineering as a part of their work); and where — most importantly — it would be possible to draw fully on the latest and best inventions as standards for practical application in technical, economic, political, and (in the narrow sense of the word) cultural work for the introduction of new forms into everyday life, for their mass production, to test their suitability, quality, cost-effectiveness and, finally, for the popularisation and propaganda of utilitarian art.

Pavilion of foods at the 1941 First Molotov Regional Exhibition of Consumer Goods

3. It would, however, be quite absurd to imagine that any art museum existing today could become such a centre. The closest form we have to what is being discussed here is the “permanent industrial-demonstration exhibition of the VSNKh [2]“.

The “permanent utilitarian-art exhibition” should not include a single “eternal” exhibit. Each section of the exhibition should be updated along the lines of technical development and the formulation of other tasks associated with the organisation of everyday life. The most typical of the withdrawn exhibits should be kept in the archive-historical section of the exhibition for scientific-research purposes. A section of the present day should also be created within the exhibition, showing works of the most varied nature that offer solutions to practical problems that occasionally arise in social practice.

Stand in the pavilion of imported goods at the 1941 First Molotov Regional Exhibition of Consumer Goods

Until such art-reactionary institutions — covered with the “dust of centuries” – as the art department of the Glavnauka [3], the Russian Academy of Artistic Sciences, and the Museum Department finally wake up; so long as the noisiest storms fail to stir them, productionists must launch their own campaign though okhobrs [4] and rabises [5], use the press, organise themselves through cooperation in order to make their own inclusion in social practice happen.

It is foolish to sit and watch how the pre-revolutionary museum rats strengthen their positions, clearly encouraged by institutions that are swollen by a sense of their own learned importance. We must take action, and I have already written of one such action — the struggle for reorganisation of the production faculties at Vkhutemas [6] — on the pages of Art and Life [“Iskussto i Zhizn”] magazine. Now, I move on to a second issue — that of a permanent exhibition of the standards of utilitarian art.

*) It is worth noting that Comrade E. Beskin, who supported me in the call for a counter-attack against the right-wingers, has for some reason developed my idea by suggesting that the painting and production faculties at Vkhutemas should help each other. This is clearly a mistake. You cannot learn to make chairs by making paintings (figurative or abstract). For the productionists, the task of mastering form has to be carried out through laboratory experiments at their own faculty. The so-called painting faculty has no role here.

B. Arvatov. “The Museum of Utilitarian Art” // Zhizn’ iskusstva [“Art Life”], 1925, № 32, p. 4 .

Translation: Ben Hooson